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Bargaining under uncertainty is modeled by the assumption that there are sev-
eral possible states of nature, each of which is identiﬁed with a bargaining problem.
We characterize bargaining solutions which generate ex ante efﬁcient combinations
of outcomes under the assumption that the bargainers have minimax regret pref-
erences. For the case of two bargainers a class of monotone utopia-path solutions
is characterized by the efﬁciency criterion, but for more than two bargainers only
dictatorial solutions are efﬁcient. By incorporating scale covariance into the mini-
max regret preferences a possibility result is obtained for the general case. Journal
of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: C78, D81, D71. © 2001 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
An n-person bargaining problem is a set of feasible utility n-tuples
together with a prespeciﬁed n-tuple, the disagreement outcome (cf. Nash,
1950). The utilities represent the preferences of the bargainers. These may
vary from preferences over lottery sets, represented by von Neumann–
Morgenstern utility functions, to proﬁt functions of ﬁrms in an oligopoly
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situation. Depending on the situation, there may be uncertainty concerning
the exact shape of the bargaining problem. For instance, demand func-
tions in an oligopoly situation may be subject to stochastic inﬂuences. A
common way to model such uncertainty is to assume that there are sev-
eral states of nature, exactly one of which will be realized as the true state.
In the present context, a state of nature can be identiﬁed with a speciﬁc
bargaining problem.
A bargaining solution (Nash, 1950) assigns a feasible utility n-tuple to
every bargaining problem. Thus, implicitly, a bargaining solution aggregates
the individual preferences of the bargainers into a collective outcome. In
the case of uncertainty, a bargaining solution assigns a utility n-tuple to each
possible bargaining problem, i.e., to each possible state of nature. Given a
speciﬁc bargaining solution to be employed, each bargainer ex ante faces a
list of possible outcomes, exactly one of which will be realized. We assume
that, in order to evaluate different lists of possible outcomes, each bar-
gainer has a preference relation over such lists. In more economic terms,
each bargainer has a criterion to decide among several contingent contracts.
Although most bargaining solutions in the literature are ex post efﬁcient,
this does not imply that they are also ex ante efﬁcient. This raises the follow-
ing questions. For a given criterion for decision making under uncertainty,
which bargaining solution(s) lead(s) to ex ante efﬁcient contingent contracts
and, conversely, for a given bargaining solution, does there exist a criterion
for decision making under uncertainty according to which a contingent con-
tract prescribed by that bargaining solution is ex ante efﬁcient?
By answering these questions, we obtain a new view on bargaining solu-
tions, as aggregators of individual preferences under uncertainty. Further-
more, the approach leads to characterizations of bargaining solutions that
are different from the usual axiomatizations and from noncooperative im-
plementations, both of which were initiated by Nash (1950, 1953).
The ﬁrst paper concerned with this approach is Bossert et al. (1996) in
which—as the main result—a class of strictly monotone path solutions is
characterized by imposing ex ante efﬁciency with respect to the maximin
criterion. According to this criterion the minimal gains with respect to the
disagreement point should be maximized.
In the present paper we consider the minimax regret criterion, where
regret is measured with respect to the utopia payoffs, i.e., the maximal
attainable payoffs. In particular, we study solutions that are ex ante efﬁ-
cient with respect to this criterion. For the n-person case (n>2) it turns
out that only the dictatorial solutions are ex ante efﬁcient with respect to
the minimax regret criterion. For the two-person case, we show that this
criterion determines a class of monotone paths, originating from the utopia
point, of which the intersection with the Pareto optimal boundary is the
solution point. Modifying the criterion such that it is compatible with scaleminimax regret and bargaining 3
covariance, however, leads to a characterization of solutions determined
by a monotone path between the normalized utopia and disagreement
points. As will be indicated, these solutions can alternatively be character-
ized by ex ante efﬁciency with respect to a version of the maximin criterion
that is compatible with scale covariance. They include the Raiffa–Kalai–
Smorodinsky solution (Raiffa, 1953; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975).
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model and main deﬁnitions. Section 3 ﬁrst deals with the minimax regret
criterion and presents the negative result for n>2 and the positive one for
n = 2. Then the minimax regret criterion is normalized in a way compatible
with scale covariance, leading to the characterization announced earlier.
Section 4 concludes. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2. MODEL AND MAIN DEFINITIONS
An n-person (bargaining) problem is a set S ⊂ n such that there is a
point ¯ d ∈ S with S ⊂ ¯ d + n
+, S is compact, contains a vector x> ¯ d, and
is strictly comprehensive, that is, for all x ∈ S and y ∈ n,i f ¯ d ≤ y ≤ x
with y  = x, then y ∈ S and there is a z ∈ S with z>y .3 Elements of
S are called feasible outcomes, while ¯ d is called the disagreement outcome.
The interpretation is that ¯ d results if the bargainers fail to reach some
other outcome x ∈ S. Note that ¯ d is uniquely determined by S, so that
we can write ¯ d = d S . The ith coordinate of an outcome represents the
utility to bargainer i. Throughout, we assume n ≥ 2 to be ﬁxed. The set of
bargainers is denoted by N  =  1     n , and  denotes the class of all
n-person bargaining problems.
Compactness is a standard condition in bargaining theory. By the
requirement S ⊂ d S +n
+ we exclude nonindividually rational outcomes
from consideration. Comprehensiveness can be interpreted as disposability
of utility. Strict comprehensiveness additionally implies that every weakly
Pareto optimal outcome is also strongly Pareto optimal, so that it sufﬁces
to deﬁne, for a bargaining problem S,
P S   =  x ∈ S  ∀ y ∈ S  y ≥ x ⇒ y = x   
the Pareto set of S. Restricting attention to strictly comprehensive problems
facilitates the exposition (see also the end of Section 3).4
3The set of all nonnegative vectors in n is denoted by n
+, and n
− is the set of all non-
positive vectors. The set of all strictly positive vectors in n is denoted by n
++. A sum like
¯ d + n
+ denotes the usual vector addition, that is, ¯ d + n
+  =   ¯ d + x   x ∈ n
+ . For any two
vectors x  y ∈ n, x> ≥ y means xi >  ≥ yi for all i = 1     n. The inequalities < and ≤
are deﬁned analogously.
4Observe that we do not impose the usual convexity assumption on the bargaining problem.
All our results, however, would go through without modiﬁcation if this assumption were added.4 bossert and peters
A (bargaining) solution is a mapping F    → n with F S ∈S for all
S ∈ . A solution F is called Pareto optimal if F S ∈P S  for all S ∈ .5
In order to introduce uncertainty into the model we assume that there
are a ﬁnite number of states of nature, exactly one of which will be realized.
It is without loss of generality and easier for the exposition of the results
to assume that there are only two states. A (bargaining) problem under
uncertainty is, thus, deﬁned by a pair  S S  ∈ × .
For each problem under uncertainty  S S  , we assume that each bar-
gainer i has a preference relation (i.e., a complete and transitive binary
relation)  i over pairs  x  x  ∈S × S  which depends only on the ith
coordinates  xi x  
i  and which is weakly monotonic. The latter means that
 x  x    i  y  y   whenever xi >y i and x 
i >y  
i, where  i denotes the asym-
metric part of  i. A preference relation with these properties is called
regular. Note that, by deﬁnition, such a preference relation depends on the
problem under uncertainty  S S  . We will, however, also use a notation
like  i to denote bargainer i’s preferences for every problem in  × ;i f
all these preferences are regular, then  i is also called regular.
Let F be a bargaining solution, and let  =    1      n , where  i is
regular for every i ∈ N. We call F efﬁcient with respect to   if for all  S S  ∈
 ×  and all  x  x  ∈S × S  there is a bargainer i with  F S  F S     i
 x  x  . In other words, there is no “contingent contract” which is strictly
preferred by all bargainers to the contract assigned by F. The following
lemma shows that efﬁciency with respect to a proﬁle of regular preferences
implies Pareto optimality.
Lemma 1. Let F be a bargaining solution, and let  =    1      n ,
with  i regular for every i ∈ N. Let F be efﬁcient with respect to  . Then F
is Pareto optimal.
In this paper we only consider regular preferences. In particular, we exclude
(possibly interesting) preferences which do not only depend on a bargainer
i’s own coordinates.
3. MINIMAX REGRET AND SCALE COVARIANCE
The utopia point u S  of a problem S ∈  is deﬁned by
ui S   =max
x∈S
xi
for every i ∈ N. Bargainer i’s minimax regret preference  u
i is deﬁned as
follows. For all  S S  ∈ ×  and all  x  x    y  y  ∈S × S ,  x  x    u
i
5We use the expression “Pareto optimal” rather than “efﬁcient” to distinguish this property
from the efﬁciency condition related to uncertainty, to be introduced below.minimax regret and bargaining 5
 y  y   if
max ui S −xi u i S  −x 
i ≤max ui S −yi u i S  −y 
i  
Note that  u
i is regular for every bargainer i.
In order to study bargaining solutions that are efﬁcient with respect
to minimax regret preferences we ﬁrst show that this condition implies a
monotonicity condition, as speciﬁed by the following lemma. The lemma is
an adaptation of Lemma 2 in Bossert et al. (1996).
Lemma 2. Let the bargaining solution F be efﬁcient with respect to  u =
  u
1      u
n . Let S T ∈ . Let x = F S  and y = F T . Then u S −x ≥
u T −y or u S −x ≤ u T −y.
Note that Lemmas 1 and 2 in particular imply translation covariance of the
solution F under consideration, i.e., F S +b = F S + b  for all S ∈  and
b ∈ n (this follows from taking T = S + b in Lemma 2).
For every i ∈ N let Di denote the dictatorial solution for player i. This
solution assigns to every S ∈  the point with ith coordinate equal to ui S 
and every other coordinate j equal to dj S . A solution F is a dictatorial
solution if there exists i ∈ N such that F = Di. Our ﬁrst theorem is an
impossibility result: if n>2, there exists no efﬁcient and nondictatorial
solution.
Theorem 1. Let n>2, and let F be a bargaining solution. Then F is
efﬁcient with respect to  u =    u
1      u
n  if, and only if, F is a dictatorial
solution.
This impossibility result does not extend to the case n = 2: there, we
can ﬁnd nondictatorial solutions that are efﬁcient with respect to max-
imin regret preferences. We start the analysis by deﬁning a monotone u-
path.6 A monotone u-path is a function w    −∞ 0 →2
− satisfying for all
s t ∈  −∞ 0  with s ≤ t:
(i) w1 s +w2 s =s
(ii) w s ≤w t .
Let W denote the collection of all monotone u-paths. With each w ∈ W
we associate a monotone u-path bargaining solution Fw, deﬁned as follows.
For a two-person bargaining problem S,
 Fw S   = P S ∩  u S +w s  s ∈  −∞ 0   
6See Thomson and Myerson (1980) for a study of solutions deﬁned with the aid of
monotone paths.6 bossert and peters
It is easy to see that Fw is well deﬁned. Observe that this deﬁnition cannot
straightforwardly be extended to more than two players: the set on the
right-hand-side of the equation could be empty. We have the following
result.
Theorem 2. Let n = 2, and let F be a bargaining solution. Then F is
efﬁcient with respect to  u =    u
1      u
n  if, and only if, F is a monotone
u-path solution.
A well-known example of a monotone u-path solution is the equal-loss solu-
tion, described by the monotone u-path w with wi t =wj t  for all t<0
and all i j ∈ N. This may be singled out by adding an axiom of anonymity
or symmetry (see also Chun, 1988).
Now we modify the minimax regret preference relation in order to
accommodate the scale covariance property. At the same time an impossi-
bility result as in Theorem 1 will be avoided.
A solution F is called scale covariant if aF S +b = F aS + b  for all
a ∈ n
++, b ∈ n, and S ∈ .7 Bargainer i’s minimax regret preference may
be normalized to a preference ˜  
u
i as follows. For all  S S  ∈ ×  and
all  x  x    y  y  ∈S × S , we have  x  x  ˜  
u




ui S −di S 
 
ui S  −x 
i





ui S −di S 
 
ui S  −y 
i
ui S  −di S  

 
Observe that this preference—called normalized minimax regret preference—
is regular, so that Lemma 1 still applies. Instead of Lemma 2 we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let the bargaining solution F be efﬁcient with respect to ˜  
u =
 ˜  
u
1     ˜  
u
n . Let S T ∈ . Let x = F S  and y = F T . Then
ui S −xi
ui S −di S 
≥
ui T −yi
ui T −di T 
for every i ∈ N
or
ui S −xi
ui S −di S 
≤
ui T −yi
ui T −di T 
for every i ∈ N.
7Here we use the notation ax  =  a1x1     a nxn  and aS  =  y ∈ n   y = ax for some x ∈
S , for all a x ∈ n and S ⊂ n.minimax regret and bargaining 7
Together with Lemma 1, Lemma 3 implies in particular that such an F is
scale covariant: take T = aS + b with a and b as in the deﬁnition of scale
covariance.
We will characterize all solutions that are efﬁcient with respect to the nor-
malized minimax regret preferences by considering normalized monotone
u-paths. Such a normalized monotone u-path is a function z    1 n →n
+
satisfying for all 1 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ n:
(a)
n
i=1 zi s =s
(b) z s ≤z t 
(c) z s ≤  1 1     1 .
Let Z denote the collection of all normalized monotone u-paths. With
each z ∈ Z we associate a normalized montone u-path bargaining solu-
tion Fz, deﬁned as follows. For a bargaining problem S ∈  with d S =
 0 0     0  and u S =  1 1     1  let
 Fz S   = P S ∩  z s  s ∈  1 n   
For an arbitrary S deﬁne Fz S =aFz a  S − d S    + d S , where a  =
u S −d S  and a  ∈ n is deﬁned by a 
i  =  ui S −di S  −1. Observe that
Fz is well deﬁned in particular by strict comprehensiveness of S, and that
Fz is scale covariant by deﬁnition.
Theorem 3. Let n ≥ 2, and let F be a bargaining solution. Then F is
efﬁcient with respect to ˜  
u = ˜  
u
1     ˜  
u
n  if, and only if, F is a normalized
monotone u-path solution.
A well-known example of a normalized monotone u-path solution is the
Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (Raiffa, 1953; Kalai and Smorodinsky,
1975), described by the path z with zi t =zj t  for all i j ∈ N and 1 ≤
t ≤ n. This solution may be characterized by adding an axiom of anonymity
or symmetry.
Normalized monotone u-path solutions may be characterized, alterna-
tively, by requiring efﬁciency with respect to a (normalized version of) the
maximin criterion, namely the preference ˜  
d
i for bargainer i deﬁned as
follows. For all  S S  ∈ ×  and all  x  x    y  y  ∈S × S , we have
 x  x  ˜  
d
i  y  y   if
min

xi − di S 
ui S −di S 
 
x 
i − di S  




yi − di S 
ui S −di S 
 
y 
i − di S  
ui S  −di S  

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A proof of the suggested characterization is left to the reader. It should
be noted that such a “dual” characterization does not hold for the non-
normalized, non-scale-covariant versions, as follows from comparing our
results with those in Bossert et al. (1996). In the latter paper strict compre-
hensiveness is not imposed. This leads to some technical complications and
the necessity to impose an additional axiom of continuity on the bargain-
ing solutions. For (non-normalized) maximin preferences, however, Bossert
et al. (1996) obtain a class of monotone path solutions, and this result can
easily be adapted to our framework. In contrast, for (non-normalized) min-
imax regret preferences, we have an impossibility result in the case of more
than two players (see Theorem 1).
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The approach followed in Bossert et al. (1996) and in this paper is essen-
tially based on the idea that a rich underlying structure with respect to
individual decision making may be used to derive implications for collec-
tive decision making while only imposing relatively mild additional require-
ments. The individual decision criteria used in this paper are minimax regret
and a normalized version thereof. In Bossert and Peters (2000), this idea is
applied to multi-attribute individual and collective decision making. Inter-
preted in a bargaining context, the results obtained there lead to general-
ized (nonsymmetric) Nash and utilitarian solutions.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1  Let S ∈  and x ∈ S\P S . By the strict compre-
hensiveness of S, there is a y ∈ S with y>x . It follows that F S   = x,
for otherwise  y  y   i  F S  F S   in  S S  by regularity of  i for all i,
violating efﬁciency of F with respect to  . This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2  Suppose not. Then there are i j ∈ N with ui S −
xi >u i T −yi whereas uj S −xj <u j T −yj.L e tI  =  k ∈ N   uk S −
xk >u k T −yk  and J  =  k ∈ N   uk S −xk <u k T −yk . Note that
I  J  = and that uk S −xk > 0 for all k ∈ I and uk T −yk > 0 for all
k ∈ J. By this and strict comprehensiveness we can ﬁnd x  ∈ S and y  ∈ T
with
∀k ∈ I   uk S −xk >u k S −x 
k >u k T −yk
∀k ∈ N\I   uk S −xk <u k S −x 
k
∀k ∈ J   uk T −yk >u k T −y 
k >u k S −xk
∀k ∈ N\J   uk T −yk <u k T −y 
k 
By construction,  x  y    u
k  x  y  for all k ∈ N, which is a violation of
efﬁciency of F with respect to  u.minimax regret and bargaining 9
Proof of Theorem 1  The if-part is left to the reader. For the only-if part
it is, in view of Lemma 2, sufﬁcient to prove that for every S ∈  there is
an i ∈ N with F S =Di S . Suppose this is not true, and let S ∈  be
such that x  = F S  <u  S . By translation covariance (see the remark
following Lemma 2) we may assume without loss of generality that u S =
 1 1     1 . Choose λ ∈  with λ<x 1 + x2 − 1, hence x1 + x2 >λ+ 1
and λ<1. Choose µ ∈  with x3 <µ<1, and let
L  = convex hull of  λ λ µ λ     λ   λ λ 1 λ     λ  zi   i ∈ N\ 3   
where zi has ith coordinate equal to 1, third coordinate equal to µ, and
all other coordinates equal to λ. Observe that u L =  1 1     1 =u S .
In view of Lemma 2, x3 <µ , and the fact that every point in L has third
coordinate at least equal to µ, it follows that F L ≥x. This, however, is
impossible because x1 + x2 >λ+ 1 >y 1 + y2 for every y ∈ L by the choice
of λ. Thus, we have a contradiction, and the proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 2  We leave veriﬁcation of the if-part to the reader.
For the only-if part, let F be a bargaining solution that is efﬁcient with
respect to  u.
First, for every −∞ <t<0 deﬁne the set Vt  =  x ∈ 2
−   x1 + x2 ≤
t  x1 ≥ t  x2 ≥ t . Deﬁne w    −∞ 0 →2
− by w 0   =0 and w t   =
F Vt  for every t<0. By Lemma 1, w satisﬁes property (i), and by Lemma
2, w satisﬁes property (ii) of a monotone u-path. Hence, w is a monotone
u-path.
The proof is completed by showing that F = Fw. By construction,
F Vt =Fw Vt  for every t<0. Let S ∈  with u S =0, and let
t  = Fw
1  S +Fw
2  S . Then Fw S =Fw Vt =F Vt . Because F Vt ∈P S ,
Lemma 2 implies F S =F Vt , hence F S =Fw S .
Finally, consider S ∈  arbitrary. Then F S =Fw S  by the previous
part of the proof and translation covariance of F(see the remark following
the proof of Lemma 2). This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3  This proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 2
and thus omitted.
Proof of Theorem 3  The if-part is left to the reader. For the only-if part,
let F be a bargaining solution that is efﬁcient with respect to ˜  
u.
Let V1  =  x ∈ n
+  
n
i=1 xi = 1  and for every 1 <t<nand 0 < <
 n − t /n let
V  






xi = t  xi ≤   for all i ∈ N

 
Observe that every such V  
t is a well-deﬁned bargaining problem, that
is, V  
t ∈ . Deﬁne z    1 n →n
+ as follows. Let z 1   =F V1  and10 bossert and peters
z n   =  1 1     1 . Take 1 <t<n . If there is an   such that n
i=1 Fi V  
t  =t then let z t  be equal to this point F V  
t  . This construc-
tion is independent of   in view of the dominance property established in
Lemma 3. The same lemma also implies that, if such an   exists for t then
it also exists for all 1 <t   <t .L e t¯ t ≤ n be the supremum of all t for which
such an   exists. Deﬁne z ¯ t   =limt→¯ t z t , and for ¯ t<t≤ n let z t  be
the point on the line segment connecting z ¯ t  and z n  with sum of the
coordinates equal to t. It is easily seen that z is a normalized monotone
u-path.
Let S ∈ . It is sufﬁcient to show that F S =Fz S . In view of scale
covariance of Fz and F we may assume without loss of generality that
d S =  0 0     0  and u S =  1 1     1 . Let 1 ≤ t<nwith t = n
i=1 Fi S . There is an   with Fz S =Fz V  
t  =F V  
t   by construc-
tion of z and deﬁnition of Fz. Because F V  
t  ∈P S , Lemma 3 implies
F S =F V  
t  , hence F S =Fz S . This completes the proof.
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